SEMINAR

National Security, Proscription, Foreign Policy : 'War on Terror' or New World Order?

Campaign Against Criminalizing Communities
Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers
Statewatch

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SUMMARY OF LECTURES

When George W. Bush told the world: "you're either with us, or with the terrorists", few people expected the 'international community' to take the same approach. But six years on, by labelling some struggles as 'terrorist' and others as legitimate, the major world powers have entrenched Bush's bogus distinction between 'good' and 'evil'. The US now has over 700 foreign military bases and installations in 130 countries and a Department of Defense that expects to be fighting a 'long war' against terrorism and other threats to security 'in dozens of other countries simultaneously and for many years to come'. Rather than distancing itself from the USA's global policing aspirations, Europe – or at least the EU and its most powerful states – is starting to assume the same militarist-crusader posture.

What are the 'deep politics' underlying the 'war on terror'? What are the prospects for peace, social justice and universal human rights? How can we challenge this new world order?

Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed
Anti-Terror Laws, Proscription and Population Control:
The Deep Politics of Global Crisis

In his presentation, Nafeez Ahmed looks at how the process of state consolidation implicit in today's anti-terror regimes relates to current trends in national security strategy, and the role that global crises like global warming, energy depletion and other related issues play to evoke fears of potential widespread civil unrest among the security agencies.

Proscription

Spearheaded by Britain since the 1970s in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict, and since the 1990s by the Clinton Administration, proscription has emerged after 9/11 to become the first line of defence of state anti-terror regimes. With the US and Britain leading the way, Western states have developed their own individual proscription regimes while the European Union and the United Nations have themselves widely expanded the scope of their own lists of banned organizations.

As a rule, the proscription process occurs in secret, with no due process or oversight and without requiring that states produce credible evidence that proscribed groups engage in any terrorist activity or justify such evidence before an independent judiciary.

The definition of terrorism itself has expanded so broadly that it does not even include the use of terror as an important criterion. Thus, UK authorities define terrorism as *"The use or threat of action designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause".* In this way, any social movements that are involved in actions designed to dissent against state policies or propose alternative policies, can be categorized as "terrorist" and banned from public life and individuals associating with such groups can be summarily prosecuted in a court of law, on the basis that they belong to a group criminalised by states outside of any legal process.

Proscription thus represents a process by which states are attempting to increasingly subjugate the legal and judicial system to unilateral state influence. It is part of a wider process by which states are attempting to interfere in all levels of the legal and judicial system, and to criminalize and prosecute whatever political activities it wishes to subdue.

Global crises and population politics

Increasingly, security agencies are concerned with developing appropriate theoretical and policy frameworks for dealing with what is now being recognized as a changed security landscape. Terrorism, still overwhelmingly projected as the predominant threat to Western civilization, is contextualised in relation to a widening diversity of threats resulting from environmental degradation, scarcities of water, oil and food, and the way in which these crises could catalyze the emergence of terrorist activity, armed conflict, massive population movements, and civil unrest. Driven by this motivation to prepare for global crises, security agencies seem to be increasingly preoccupied with population politics – that is, the danger posed by rising populations in the South generally, and of Muslims in particular.

> Thus the US Department of Defense's *2008 Army Modernization Strategy* posits that *"We have entered an era of persistent conflict… a security environment much more ambiguous and unpredictable than that faced during the cold war… We face a potential return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets."* Later on, the report warns that rapid population growth will present the US with increased "resource competition" as these expanding populations in the poorer South "will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy."
> Likewise, a classified study by the CIA's National Intelligence Council, claims that climate change is a "threat-multiplier" to traditional security issues such as "political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens."

Particular attention is paid to the potential for population migration to cause deepening divisions over ethnicity and race in the Western hemisphere.

> Thus CIA Director Michael Hayden warns that "European countries, many of which already have large immigrant communities, will see particular growth in their Muslim populations while the number of non-Muslims will shrink as birthrates fall". "Social integration of immigrants will pose a significant challenge to many host nations -- again boosting the potential for unrest and extremism."
> European intelligence analysts estimate that up to 2 per cent of the continent's Muslims – 500,000 people – are involved in extremist activity. This number is supposedly so huge not because of the role of Islamic fundamentalism *per se*, but rather simply due to an identity crisis resulting from the "chemistry resulting from Muslims' encounter with Europe".

Consequently, Liz Fekete of the Institute of Race Relations has documented a sweeping intensification of anti-Muslim xenophobia across the EU, resulting in attempts to criminalise the Muslim practice of faith, ban mosques, proscribe the Qur'an and shrink Muslim populations in Europe.

In the official discourse, Islamist terrorism is said to originate in a form of extremism that, however marginal, is nevertheless *widely dispersed throughout Muslim communities*, necessitating comprehensive regimes of surveillance, policing and in some regions counterinsurgency. For instance, a sensitive briefing paper published by the Pentagon agency, Counter-Intelligence Field Activity, has been highly critical of what it describes as Western political correctness, arguing that "political Islam wages an ideological battle against the non-Islamic world at the tactical, operational and strategic level."

Similarly, a leaked classified operational briefing note by MI5's Behavioural Science Unit concludes that British Muslim terrorists are "a diverse collection of individuals, fitting no single demographic profile, nor do they all follow a typical pathway to violent extremism." The study is based on hundreds of case studies - although the number of terrorist convictions in the UK to date are about a dozen. Most of these are non-Muslim. Against this reality, the official discourse deepens the impression that the threat of Islamist extremism is generalized, amorphously entrenched in otherwise peaceful and moderate Muslim communities. It also contradicts the documented fact that every single islamist terror plot in the UK has been linked to a single particular extremist group, formerly known as al-Muhajiroun.

Global Police State

Together, the US, UK and EU states are pushing the boundaries of what they can do while inflating the threat of Muslim terrorism.

After the US Department of Justice passed a regulation allowing indefinite detention on 20th September 2001, nearly 1,200 Arabs and Muslims were secretly arrested and detained without charge.

Under the US National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), no terrorists were found, yet over 13,000 of the 80,000 men who registered were threatened with deportation, and many were "detained in harsh conditions."

In the UK, more than a thousand Muslims have been detained without charge under anti-terror laws. Of these, only a handful have been convicted of terrorist offences.

Worldwide, over 100,000 Muslim men – victims of the CIA's extraordinary rendition programme – are being detained without charge "in secretive American-run jails and interrogation centres similar to the notorious Abu Ghraib Prison" under conditions which violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners, and UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

Such practices accompany Anglo-American military engagements in predominantly Muslim theatres of war – both overt and covert – such as in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia, or Algeria. These conflicts correlate invariably with their strategic location in terms of contested hydrocarbon energy reserves in the Middle East, Central Asia and Northwest Africa.

Architectures of Control

To counteract the purported threat of terrorism, governments have adopted increasingly draconian anti-terror laws, which in practice have been applied indiscriminately as measures of population control. As such, they were directed not merely against Muslims and immigrants, but also to criminalize political dissidents, and individuals protesting against Western domestic and foreign policies.

In 2004, protestors at the arms fair in the Docklands were stopped and searched under the Terrorism Act 2000 although they were not committing or threatening any violent act.

In 2003, anti-terrorist powers were used to prevent a coach load of people at Fairford from attending a demonstration altogether.

In August 2007, anti-terrorism powers were used to question anyone approaching the Climate Camp near Heathrow airport. The scope of surveillance even included residents of a nearby village who were preparing to march against the loss of their homes to airport expansion.

In October 2008, by vastly expanding the scope of their application, the British government used anti-terror powers to take control of assets held in Britain by an Icelandic bank, Landsbanki, when it collapsed in the wake of the global banking crisis.

There are disturbing indications that, as part of their contingency planning for the domestic impact of global crises and the corresponding increase in the probability of civil unrest, military and security agencies in the West are prepared to execute unprecedented measures of population control.

Indeed, the scope of power transferred to the American government through several pieces of legislation was in the British case achieved in one fell swoop with the UK Civil Contingencies Act 2004. This gave the government extraordinary powers of social control to deal with unprecedented social crises resulting from a variety of causes.

Unknown to most British citizens, UK emergency civilian response powers have already been militarized by stealth.

Among the governmental powers enabled by the Act, the government can declare a state of emergency at its discretion, without a parliamentary vote, or even without publicly declaring a state of emergency;

Ministers can introduce "emergency regulations" under the Royal Prerogative without recourse to parliament; such regulations allow government officials to "give directions or orders" of virtually unlimited scope, including the destruction of property, prohibiting assemblies, banning travel, sealing of cities, cutting phone lines, censoring the media, and outlawing "other specified activities".

The armed services can be deployed without parliamentary notification or approval, and emergency regulations may be passed with a view to "protecting or restoring activities of Her Majesty's Government."

Systemic Origins of Terrorism and Global Crisis

The securitisation of global crises serves states by allowing them to deflect attention from the real causes of these crises. Both terrorism and global crises like climate change manifest deeper systemic and structural problems in the global political economy. Western states show no desire to transform these structures.

In the case of terrorism for instance, extensive historical and empirical evidence confirms that al-Qaeda terrorist networks have been, and continue to be, covertly sponsored by several key states in the Middle East and Central Asia, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, Pakistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, among others. Yet these very states are directly and indirectly sponsored by the US, UK and EU. Our relationship with these states is a direct consequence of the over-dependence of the global political economy on oil. In short, industrial civilization's oil addiction has generated a structural entanglement with dictatorial oil-exporting regimes that are cultivating terrorist networks which target the core centres of power in the West.

In this way, the global political economy's over-dependence on oil is intrinsically linked to the continued sponsorship of the terrorist networks which we are supposed to be fighting. Simultaneously, global crises like climate change are a direct result of the same over-dependence on oil, whereby we continue to pump fossil fuel emissions into the atmosphere at ever increasing rates. Rather than addressing the systemic origins of terrorism, climate change and resource scarcity within the overall structure of the global political economy, Western states are developing innovative political, legal and military mechanisms to sustain this structure, to continue operate as usual, and to consolidate state power at the expense of the rights and well-being of the majority of the world's populations. As global crises escalate with increasingly ruinous impact on our societies, it is only a matter of time before these new mechanisms begin to interfere not only with the lives of Muslims, immigrants, and activists, but more generally with the lives of Western citizens from all backgrounds.

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Paul Rogers

In his presentation, Paul Rogers looks at the nature of the 'War on Terror' and urges policy makers to rethink the structure of engagement under which the global political economy is governed.

The antecedents of today's 'Global War on Terror' can be traced to the assertive nationalism and realism prevailing in international relations consequent upon the advent on neoconservatism in US politics and the agenda of the Project for a New American Century in 1997. In the neoconservative view, the demise of the Soviet Union legitimized US-style liberal market capitalism as the singular valid political and economic system to be emulated globally, under US leadership, and mirroring a global international relations system not dissimilar to the Pax Britannica of the late 1890s. Neoconservatism established itself as the dominant foreign policy and security paradigm under the incoming presidency of George W. Bush in November 2000, and resulted into a very unilateralist foreign policy. This paradigm eschewed any possibility of agreeing to a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; at the same time, it promoted a withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, withdrawal from the Kyoto Climate Change Protocol, the opposition to a tightening of the Biological Weapons Convention, the opposition to aspects of the International Criminal Court and even the opposition to the Anti-personal Landmine Ban. Although influential, this radical vision of America's role in the world was never representative of the broader American foreign policy establishment.

It is in this context that the terror attacks of 9/11 occurred. At the time, many observers were driven to compare the impact of this event with that of Pearl Harbour. Paul Rogers differs with this position. Pearl Harbour was a military attack by a foreign nation against a US military base in distant Hawaii, during a period in which both nations were already at a heightened state of tension. By contrast, 9/11 was a surprise attack on iconic military and economic structures, being watched on prime time television while thousands of people were killed, and being subsequently used to legitimize a virtually unchallenged foreign policy response.

The first response was the displacement from power of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which, in the view of some critics, was not the sole or even most appropriate course of action to take. Some commentators went so far as to claim that this intervention may even have been the intended outcome of al Qaeda, by drawing the US into a protracted war in Afghanistan which in the perception of these fanatics had already contributed to the defeat of another superpower, the Soviet Union, in the 1980s. The alternative path of bringing the hijackers to justice within the framework of civil criminal proceedings was never seriously contemplated however. Instead, with the termination of the Taliban regime, the prevailing expectation was that Afghanistan would establish a peaceful and broadly pro-western government and permit the installation of permanent US military bases at Bagram and Kandahar, which would be financed by the Europeans.

The 'War on Terror' was later broadened by George Bush, first in his State of the Union Address in January 2002 by extending it to the entire 'Axis of Evil', and a few months later, in his West Point Graduation Address, by claiming a military right to pre-empt any future threat and to force regime change in any nation perceived to constitute a potential threat. These seminal speeches constituted a significant development of the US foreign policy doctrine and gave rise to widespread consternation both within European political circles and among the wider public. Consequently, by spring 2002, the entire political establishment was abuzz with plans to bring about the next regime change, that of Iraq.

All three initiatives, the War on Terror, the invasion of Afghanistan and the war on Iraq, evolved in ways that were significantly different from what was expected. Regarding Iraq, the expectation was that the Saddam Hussein regime would be terminated very rapidly, that Iraq would quickly establish a deregulated free market economy, followed by the establishment of permanent military bases. These activities, in combination, were designed to contain Iran by entrenching strong Western influence in Afghanistan to the east and in Iraq to the west. Iran, it must be noted, was always conceived to be the real threat in the region. The reality in Iraq is of course very different. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the US is indeed sucked into what appears to be a very long war, just as the critics had suggested seven years ago, with US troop commitments being anticipated to increase from 63,000 to 80,000 over the next six to nine months.

The al Qaeda movement is best characterized as a transnational revolutionary movement whose energy is rooted in radical religious belief rather than a revolutionary ideology. It has a number of short term aims. These include

> the replacement of what it perceives to be unacceptable political regimes across the Middle East, and notably in Saudi Arabia, the seat of the Islamic holy cities;
> eviction of the 'crusader forces' from the Middle East;
> intense anti-Zionism and
> support of separatist movements as far afield as Chechnya and southern Thailand.
> It also has an overarching enemy, the United States, along with its strategic ally, Israel.

The movement is unusual in that, being a religious movement, it does not expect to achieve its aims within its own lifetime, the establishment of a renewed caliphate being anticipated in centuries rather than decades.

The War on Terror has been in many ways counterproductive as far as the US is concerned, and military circles appear to be very uncertain as to what happens next. Within the broader spectrum of threats facing the world, terrorism is not the most serious one. Rather, the overarching strategic threats are threefold:

1) The liberal market economy has not delivered social justice; instead, income disparities have been widening over the past 30 years with 20% of the world's population now controlling 85% of global wealth while 50% of the world's population only controls 1% of global wealth.

2) With increased literacy and education levels and improved communication infrastructures, the marginalized majority is now far more aware of its relative disenfranchisement than it was in the past.

3) Environmental constraints, such as the combined effects of climate change and resource shortages, coalesce with other geopolitical trends to create a world which is significantly more fragile than it has been over the past 50 years - unless some major change occurs which mitigates such threats.

From this perspective, Paul Rogers concurs with Nafeez Ahmed in urging policy makers to look at the underlying problems of the political economy rather than simply maintaining the status quo. In his view, Western societies have at present two strategic opportunities:

1. They can recognize that the War on Terror represents a classical example of old thinking which has failed in its principal aim to maintain control in a globalized world. They can then transition towards a more flexible, less controlled system of governance, more congenial to an open and interdependent global political economy;

2. They may seize the opportunity provided by the current financial crisis to fundamentally rethink the way in which the global political economy is articulated, and address fundamental structural shortcomings in the liberal market economy.

Short of embracing these fundamental alternatives to the 'Global War on Terror', the threat of additional terror threats similar to 9/11 will continue unabated.

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David Chandler

David Chandler, while not fundamentally disagreeing with the surface description of the events under consideration, differs with the previous two speakers on the diagnosis of the situation and the political clarity they suggested. In particular, one should avoid a pitfall frequently found in left-wing discourse, which consists in interpreting current restrictions on civil liberties and attacks on international law by assuming a conscious project of power, according to which the real or perceived threat of terror is used opportunistically by a more or less united power elite to consolidate state power against an increasingly disenfranchised citizenry, or to derail global society projects or human rights achievements from the 1990s in order to achieve purported imperialistic goals.

Such discourse assumes that power by itself is sufficient to either control the events so as to ensure the desired outcome, or at least opportunistically use the events so as to catalyse change in the desired direction. Rather than positing a straightforward linkage between 9/11 and the ensuing erosion of civil liberties or consolidation of state power, it would be more correct to suggest that while the rules of the political game have certainly changed, the threats to civil liberties antedate 9/11, and in the absence of this event would otherwise have been undermined under different circumstances.

Consequently, the relationship between the power elites and the wider citizenry, the way in which this relationship was framed, the way in which they created their identities, structured their policies and projected certain political values, were suddenly shaken up with the end of the cold war. Traditional ways of social engagement within the political sphere, which gave content to our concepts by means of which we mediated our engagement, including our ideas on civil liberties and free speech, had already become eroded prior to 9/11. Consequently, political concepts like liberty and freedom had already become eroded, not as a result of a deceptive discourse on terror, but because society had gradually taken them for granted and forgotten why their ancestors had struggled for such concepts in the first place.

As a result of the progressive conceptual dilution of such values as freedom, liberty and autonomy, encroachments on liberty were naturally accepted under the new circumstances as a matter of course. As a case in point, frequent reporting or longer pre-trial detention, which in former times might have been regarded as draconian, have now become widely accepted.

In the international arena, one may understand the erosion of international law as a consequence of increased US hegemony. However, other factors were at work as well. The failure of third world independence movements, or the failure of post-colonial states to modernize, undermined the UN Charter's promise of sovereign equality from being given serious content through development. Consequently, rights such as state sovereignty and equality, rather than being proclaimed categorically, were increasingly contextualized and relativized in the event of serious human rights violations or in the case of very weak or even failed states. This in turn suggested that sovereign equality did not emerge from an abstract process of UN legal theorizing, but rather in the context of pronounced international rivalry, which prevailed during the cold war, and in which the lack of state sovereignty could lead to a threat of nuclear annihilation. After the demise of the Soviet Union, with the advent of a more multipolar world and a more hierarchical relationship between the West and the post-colonial world, sovereign equality suddenly seemed less relevant. By contrast, the failure of third world liberation movements impacted elites both in the developing countries and in the western world, and especially in states with poor levels of education, little wealth or poor human rights standards.

Seen in this context, the international sphere is best conceived of as empty of politics, and the breakdown of international law should not be seen as driven by material interests such as control of oil or natural resources by the West, given that these states have little else to trade. Interstate relations are consequently ad hoc in nature and rather arbitrary, where elites don't have a clear strategy, find it difficult to define what their interests are, or to rally society behind such interests. Rather, in such a context, power relations are attenuated, atomized and broken down. The fact that state powers intervene domestically or western powers intervene internationally does not imply the existence of a strategy to do so, or even the existence of clearly defined interests, but nevertheless result in a concomitant erosion of civil liberties and international law.

Such a constructivist view of international relations can be elicited to explain features of the current discourse on the 'War on Terror', such as how war could be waged against a concept, or the absence of agreed metrics for desired outcomes. As a result, the 'War on Terror' could be defined in any possible way as desired. Likewise, the 42 day detention period contemplated under new anti-terror legislation, was variously characterized by lawyers, intelligence executives and police officials as unreasonable, irrational, disproportionate and overly politicized, begging the question as to why these provisions were introduced in the first place. David Chandler suggests that this attempt at staking a claim reflects not so much an attempt by the state to consolidate power or to solve a technical issue, but rather an inability of the elites to articulate what the 'War on Terror' should entail. Consequently, the more difficult it becomes to articulate a strategy or political goal, the more it will be defined in terms of one's political identity, such as when a military intervention is rationalized either in terms of a perceived need for humanitarian intervention or as a punitive measure against purported rogue states. Such rationalizations do not reflect political strategy. Rather, they constitute statements about political identity. Likewise, the discourse about the relationship between liberties and the 'War on Terror' reveals a weakness and a lack of direction among political elites rather than the purported strength of a consolidated state power.

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Tony Bunyan

An Unprecedented Attack on Civil Rights

Tony Bunyan has been an active civil rights advocate since the 1960s. Ever since writing his book "*The Political Police in Britain*", he has gained a deep sense about the dialectics and history of political repression in this country. This sense of history is deemed to be of paramount importance in order to gain a proper perspective into the present. Having analyzed state repression in Britain since the 1960s and at the European level since the 1980s, Tony Bunyan has documented what plans existed prior to 9/11 and what plans came thereafter. He must therefore be deemed authoritative when, in light of the factual evidence at hand, he concludes that the existence and scope of current restrictions on civil liberties are both massive and unprecedented by historical standards. In his presentation, Tony Bunyan goes beyond the British context by providing a broad outline of current national security initiatives planned at the EU level. He concludes that, in combination, they will amount to an unprecedented onslaught on civil liberties in Britain and Europe alike.

Starting with the Tampere Program, the European Union's security policy evolves through a recurrent 5 year plan, the present one being referred to as the Hague Programme of 2005-2009, which is to be followed by the Stockholm Programme in the ensuing 5 years. The first two plans were elaborated entirely by governments without any input from civil society or national parliaments whatsoever. Under the current program, nine governments have appointed a commission to write a report, which Statewatch has analysed in detail in its Special Report "*The Shape of Things to Come. The EU Future Group*" available on the Statewatch website. http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/the-shape-of-things-to-come.pdf   The report constitutes the key security strategy document of the EU. It is binding upon the Council, the EU Commission and the European Parliament. It will be submitted by the EU Future Group to the Commission, which will in turn call for a consultation, during which it will ask extraordinarily limited questions such as whether respondents are in favour of reinforced EU initiatives addressing corruption or not. The reality will be that consultation of parliament will be purely formal and that the EU Commission will adopt the program next year for the ensuing five years.

The key context for the document is the 'War on Terror'. This is inappropriate, since the type of terrorism which we are facing is not the traditional political terrorism which is capable of destroying our democracies. Rather it is the very policies adopted in response to such terrorism, and which cynically claim to 'balance' liberty and security, that will undermine our democracy and our rights. This approach does not reflect the way in which broad constituencies within the European member states look at issues of national security and civil rights. Rather, what may have been an exceptional response to an immediate crisis in 2001 has by now become the norm. In this way, the exception has come to define the norm, and it is increasingly the state which defines what the norm should be and what powers it should have over our civil liberties.

Current Security Strategy of the EU Future Group

The EU Future Group's report currently incorporates several key principles.

> **Data Availability** The first principle is the *Principle of Availability* according to which all information collected by any government agency, immigration or customs department, police station or other access point should be made available to all the other agencies, Europe-wide, and irrespective of current constraints on data protection.

Technological Interoperability The second element is the *Principle of Interoperability*, which aims to ensure, at the technological level, that all computers and databases are converged and interoperable on the basis of similar data models.

Convergence The third element, the *Principle of Convergence*, in fact constitutes the next step in the process of statebuilding. It provides that European police and security agencies will operate with a common technology, with common equipment, and common training and operational procedures. More crucially, it also entails a degree of legal and procedural harmonization which in effect will result in removing any obstacles to such convergence. Targeted protections include legal safeguards or judicial authorizations required for telephone surveillance or data sharing with domestic or international security agencies. The overarching effect of harmonization will be to converge any remaining safeguards onto the lowest possible common denominator.

Digital Tsunami The fourth key element of the Report is the *Digital Tsunami*, which has now become an accepted term within the EU's technical lexicon. According to the Portuguese Presidency's input into the EU Futures Report, the initiative seeks to ensure that "*every object which individuals use, every transaction they make, and wherever they go, will create a detailed digital record. This will generate a wealth of information for public security organizations and create huge opportunities for more effective and productive public security efforts*". This information, which will include tax, employment and bank details, credit card uses, biometrics, health and criminal records, information on the use of eGovernment services or libraries, travel history, telephone and internet usage as well as numerous other data will enable interested parties to collect an unprecedented wealth of information about every individual, and to analyze such information using state of the art datamining and artificial intelligence technologies. The intention of the program is then to bring this information into machine-readable format, and to have computers analyse and prognosticate citizens' behaviour in real time and to formulate policy recommendations, again in real time, for public security and other government agencies suggesting if, when and how they should intervene.

Incredibly, the program also seeks permission from the participating governments to legalize the remote search of computer hard drives. German participants in this program are currently seeking authorization to use such capabilities for counter-terrorist intelligence purposes under the German constitution. Likewise, a recent EU cyber crime document recently surfaced according to which the EU is currently seeking authorization to gain remote access to home computer hard-drives across domestic borders. Such isolated initiatives have now found their way into the document, during a period where sensitive political issues are being worked out. Rather than mandating technological or procedural details under which such intrusion could be used, the policy seeks an immediate blanket authorization for '*enabling*' government agents to provisionally gain remote access to all computer hard drives across Europe. However, the corollary of a technical capability for remotely *searching* computer hard drives is of course a corresponding technical ability to remotely *alter* the information on such hard drives, and to delete or add to its content.

The Security Industrial Nexus

It must be noted that the technological capabilities for carrying out such an unprecedented surveillance and artificial intelligence project already existed before 9/11. However, significant legal constraints existed in regards to the usage of such technologies by both government agencies and the private sector. Significantly, 9/11 occurred precisely at a point in capitalism's technological evolution, at which such technologies started to become commercializable and could be widely deployed over the internet and otherwise, but were at the same time being held back by liberal concepts of privacy and data protection.

After 2001, 9/11 was cynically invoked by a majority of governments to legalise the use of these technologies. In many cases, these technologies have been laying dormant for years although plans had been made to deploy them whenever the opportunity presented itself. Such was the case in Britain, when on September 26, 2001, readily available plans were implemented which had been formulated long before.

The current consensus on national security policy is fostered primarily by a coalition sponsored on the one hand by the law enforcement and national security agencies, and on the other hand by multinational corporations. Some of the latter are set to derive multi-billion Dollar revenues out of the implementation and administration of such surveillance programs. In particular, with the harmonization of national security administrations between the EU and the US, these multinationals are positioned to capitalize on such trends not only in their respective domestic home markets, but within a globalized market, in which they hold first mover advantages and are consequently poised to exploit leadership positions.

Within the general logic of this development, the next phase of supranational integration will be catalyzed by the further globalization of national security programs and by the imposition of new levels of governance on top of existing European governance structures – chaotic, inefficient and democratic. The EU Future Group Report indeed provides for the deployment, by 2014, of a 'Euro-Atlantic Area Co-operation with the United States for Freedom Justice and Security'. Presumably, this body will then decide on the scope of our civil liberties and that of our migrants, fleeing political persecution or poverty.

Within this context, such traditional concepts as liberty, freedom and justice have undergone a significant shift in meaning over the past few years. In the year 2000, when a racist, quasi-fascist right wing coalition movement was elected in Austria, the country was expelled from the EU for six months. Later, Italy, embarrassed about what happened in Austria, refrained from allowing a similar right-wing party to enter the government. Contemporaneous with such a conceptual shift in our political lexicon was a concomitant shift towards the right within our parliaments. In 1999, of 15 member governments in the European Union, 12 were social democratic and three were on the right. Today, of 27 members in the European Union, 21 are center-right or far right whereas six, including Britain, are social democratic. These are the governments which are now running the EU Council and which are likely, after the next election, to hold a controlling majority in the European Parliament for the next five years. Under such preconditions, a recent statement by Mr. Gijs de Vries, the Chairman of the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF), may become symptomatic of the broader understanding about the relationship between liberty and security within the EU: in his latest report , Mr. de Vries writes : "*Security is the precondition for liberty*".

The reverse is true. Rights and freedoms and liberty are not values to be balanced or withered away by governments in the name of security. They are fundamental values which are universal, and which define democracies in their progressive sense and distinguish them from pseudo-"democracies", in which they are a sham and touted in word only but not lived in deed. If we do not safeguard this fundamental understanding, we will go down the road of an EU with perhaps a democratic veneer, but which is in fact on the fast lane towards an autocratic society.

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